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I. INTRODUCTION
This article arises from a debate hosted at The University of Akron
School of Law and reflects the arguments made by the author at that
debate, which focused on the case of Greece v. Galloway. 1
At issue in Greece was the constitutionality of the town of Greece’s
practice of opening its monthly town board meetings with an invocation
given by a volunteer chaplain of the month. 2 The United States Court of
* Patrick Garry is a law professor at the University of South Dakota. He received a J.D. and a Ph.D.
in Constitutional History from the University of Minnesota.
1. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014). After the debate, the author
prepared these written remarks. After submitting these remarks, the United States Supreme Court
decided the case, and the author submits this analysis without modification following the Supreme
Court’s opinion.
2. Members of many different religious traditions delivered invocations; the town allowed
any interested person to offer an invocation and never declined a request to deliver an invocation
before a Board Meeting. Pet. App 20a, 125a. Although the great majority of the invocations were
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Appeals for the Second Circuit, using the endorsement test, ruled that
this practice violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution. 3
II. THE SHORT ANSWER: MARSH SUPPORTS THE PRAYER PRACTICE
In Marsh v. Chambers, the Supreme Court approved the practice of
opening legislative sessions with a prayer delivered by a state-employed
chaplain. 4 The Court specifically ruled that the use of a prayer to open a
legislative session did not constitute an establishment of religion but was
“simply a tolerable acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the
people of this country.” 5 The Court articulated two exceptions: (1) if the
government acts with an impermissible motive in selecting the prayergivers; or (2) if the government uses the prayer practice to proselytize on
behalf of a particular religion. 6
Even though the Second Circuit did not find that either of the two
Marsh exceptions existed in Galloway, the court struck down the
prayer. 7 Instead of the Marsh “historical traditions” test, which was
previously used in Van Orden v. Perry to uphold a Ten Commandments
display, the Second Circuit applied the “endorsement test” to strike
down the prayer practice. 8
The Marsh test is the most relevant test in evaluating the
constitutionality of legislative prayer and, thus, should dictate that the
prayer practice in Greece is not judicially prohibited.

given by Christian representatives, recent invocation-givers included a Buddhist, a person whose
religion was listed as Cherokee Indian, and a Wiccan High Priest. C.A. App. A1053-55.
Furthermore, the town did not monitor the content of the invocations given. Pet. App. 8a. See Brief
for Petitioner at 6-7, Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL
3935899, at *7.
3. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 29-31 (2d Cir. 2012).
4. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983). The Court found there was nothing
unconstitutional about having the prayer given by the same state-paid, Christian-denomination
chaplain who had given the opening prayer for sixteen years. Id. at 793-94.
5. Id. at 792. According to Marsh, “historical evidence sheds light not only on what the
draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that Clause
applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress.” Id. at 790. Additionally, because
legislative prayer was a common practice preceding and during the constitutional period, the
historical approach of Marsh was consistent with constitutional reality, finding that legislative
prayer was not an establishment of religion. Id. at 786-92.
6. Id. at 793-95.
7. On appeal, respondents dropped their argument that the town had intentionally
discriminated against non-Christians, and the Second Circuit found there was “no religious animus”
in the town’s invocation practice. Pet. App. 22a. See Brief for Petitioner at 10, Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014) (No. 12-696), 2013 WL 3935899, at *8.
8. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 30; Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, syllabus (2005).
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III. THE LONG ANSWER: THE MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
A.

The Confusing State of Jurisprudence

Perhaps the unprecedented decision by the Second Circuit, as well
as the striking down of a long-established practice, occurred in large part
because of the confusing nature of the Supreme Court’s Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. This confusing and convoluted jurisprudence has
been widely noted by scholars and court observers. 9 A prime example
of such confusion and inconsistency occurred in 2005 when the Supreme
Court decided two similar cases, both involving public displays of the
Ten Commandments, with exactly opposite results and essentially using
three different constitutional tests. 10
There is great doctrinal disarray in the Supreme Court’s use of its
Establishment Clause tests. 11 The oldest test, the Lemon test, has been
abandoned by the Court. 12 The Marsh historical traditions test was
virtually ignored by the Second Circuit; instead, it used the endorsement
test, which was initially intended to be more accommodating to the
historical role and presence of religion in society. 13 On the other hand,
the coercion test, previously used nearly exclusively with public prayers,
was not used or referenced by the Second Circuit.14
The number of different tests, along with the confusing ways in
which those tests are applied, means that courts can pick and choose
among tests so as to reach and justify almost any decision. However,
despite the plethora of tests, the Supreme Court has never defined the
most crucial term of the Establishment Clause – the term
“establishment.” Instead, it has used tests to determine whether the
9. See Patrick M. Garry, Distorting the Establishment Clause into an Individual Dissenter’s
Right, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 661, 661-62 (2013).
10. Compare McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, paragraph one of the syllabus
(2005) (striking down a frame display of the Ten Commandments using the secular purpose test),
with Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 685-92 (upholding the display under the Marsh test); see also id. at
701-06 (Breyer, J., concurring) (using his own legal judgment test as swing vote to uphold display).
11. See Patrick M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More Than Neutrality, 57 FLA. L.
REV. 1, 3-6 (2005).
12. See id. at 6 (describing the Court utilizing different tests before settling on the neutrality
approach).
13. The test, first used in Lynch v. Donnelly, upheld a public display of a Christmas crèche.
465 U.S. 668 (1984). Then, in Salazar v. Buono, the test was used to strike down a memorial to
World War I veterans built decades earlier by private groups and funds, but using a Roman cross.
559 U.S. 700 (2010).
14. For cases applying the coercion test to public prayers, see, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 316 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992).
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“symptoms” of establishment are occurring. But this practice has
produced, in Justice Kennedy’s words, a “jurisprudence of minutia,”
extending the reach of that clause to the most discreet, insular, and
momentary interactions between government and religion. 15
B.

The Purpose of the Establishment Clause

The issue in Greece is not the appropriateness, sensitivity, or
wisdom of the prayers. It is not whether religiously-motivated people
can act with unkindness and inconsideration, or whether religiouslymotivated people always live up to their beliefs. It is not about whether
some people are offended by the prayers. The Establishment Clause is
not about feelings, just as the Speech Clause is not about the feelings of
people who disagree with or are offended by other people’s speech. The
issue in Greece is whether the government of that town acted or
exercised a power forbidden by the First Amendment. 16
The Establishment Clause forbids laws “respecting” an
establishment of religion. 17 It does not forbid laws accommodating,
The
facilitating, or supporting religion or religious freedom. 18
endorsement test, as it has evolved, tends to equate establishment with
people’s feelings of offense or marginalization when confronting public
displays or expressions of religion. 19 A more historically accurate
definition, however, has been provided by Michael McConnell. 20 He
reminds us that, during the constitutional period, establishments of
religion were characterized by factors such as government financial
support of a religion, government control of church doctrine or
personnel, and government assignment of important civil functions to a
religion. 21 This definition of establishment, contrary to the endorsement
test, focuses on the actions of the state and the institutional connections
or interferences between government and particular religious groups.
The scope and nature of the Establishment Clause should also be
viewed in connection with the scope and nature of the Free Exercise
15. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
16. Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1818.
17. U.S. Const. amend. I.
18. The First Amendment must allow the government to “respect the religious nature of our
people and accommodate the public service to their spiritual needs.” Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 314 (1952).
19. See Garry, supra note 10, at 678-81 (discussing the endorsement test as a form of
dissenter’s right because of a fear of marginalizing dissenters).
20. Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2131-76 (2003).
21. Id.
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Clause. For instance, the Establishment Clause is often seen as the only
protector against public-religious interactions that may be overreaching,
coercive, or intimidating to objectors. 22 However, the Free Exercise
Clause, as the dominant liberty clause, protects against government
actions that coerce, infringe on, or intimidate an individual’s exercise or
non-exercise of religious beliefs. 23
The Establishment Clause also works in tandem with the Free
Exercise Clause. 24 Both clauses are complimentary to each other,
insofar as both serve the cause of religious liberty. 25 Whereas the Free
Exercise Clause is the primary religious liberty clause, serving as the
individual or minority rights clause, the Establishment Clause is more
narrowly focused on the group or institutional aspect of religion. 26 The
Establishment Clause is not an individual rights clause; it is a clause
focused on the institutional liberty and autonomy of religious
organizations. 27 A government establishment of religion (such as
occurred with the Church of England) violates the liberty and autonomy
of the religion that is taken over by the government, as well as the liberty
of all other religious institutions consequently discriminated against or
handicapped by having another religion receive preferential government
treatment. 28
As a religious liberty clause, the Establishment Clause is not a
secularism clause; its primary effect is not to ensure a secular society,
free from the public presence of religion. 29 Nothing in the constitutional
debates or history suggests that the First Amendment framers wanted to
achieve and then ensure a secular society. Indeed, the overwhelming
evidence points to just the opposite desire. 30 The First Amendment, by
recognizing religion as the first liberty, recognizes the specialness of
religion to the framers and drafters. This is not to say that the
Establishment Clause does not, to some degree, carry indirect benefits
for secularism. However, secularism is not the Clause’s primary
purpose.
22. See Patrick M. Garry, The Institutional Side of Religious Liberty: A New Model of the
Establishment Clause, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1155, 1166 (2004).
23. Id.
24. For a discussion on the relationship between the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses, the nature of each, and the ways in which they complement each other, see id. at 11581160, 1163-1170.
25. See Garry, supra note 10, at 662-68.
26. See id. at 662.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 666-68.
29. See id. at 684, 688-90.
30. See id. at 670-74.
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One way in which the Establishment Clause is used as a secularism
clause is its attempted application as a “heckler’s veto.” Primarily
through the endorsement test, as used by the Second Circuit, the
Establishment Clause has been interpreted as a “reverse” Free Exercise
Clause, aimed at protecting an individual dissenter’s right to be free
from exposure to the public presence of religion. 31 Under this
interpretation, the Free Exercise Clause protects the freedom to practice
religion, whereas the Establishment Clause protects a freedom from the
public practice of religion. But again, nothing in the constitutional
history suggests that the Establishment Clause was meant to be a
“reverse” Free Exercise Clause, nor that it was intended to be what the
Speech Clause was not – i.e., a heckler’s veto. 32 Indeed, Marsh
contradicted a heckler’s veto view of the Establishment Clause by
focusing on government intent rather than on the prayer’s effect on
listeners. 33
C.

Historical Proof of an Accommodating Establishment Clause

As recognized in Marsh, there was much interplay between religion
and the public square at the time the Bill of Rights was passed. 34
Religion played a prominent role not only in society but in the framers’
conception of democracy and civic life.35 According to the Marsh
Court, the Establishment Clause was not intended to eliminate religion’s
role or interplay with society. 36 To the contrary, the Clause was meant
to accommodate the types of relationships between religion and the
public square that existed at the time of the First Amendment’s framing
and ratifying. 37

31. Id. at 685.
32. The Establishment Clause does not protect against feelings of offense. “People may take
offense at all manner of religious as well as nonreligious messages, but offense alone does not in
every case show a violation.” Lee, 505 U.S. at 597. See also Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001) (refusing to apply the Establishment Clause “using a modified
heckler’s veto” on behalf of perceptions of certain people who disagree with the perceived
message).
33. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794-95. Moreover, in Van Orden, Justice Thomas found the
impressions of dissenters to the display irrelevant to any Establishment Clause ruling. 545 U.S. at
696-98 (Thomas, J., concurring).
34. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 787-88.
35. See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002); JOHN
WITTE JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES (2000). See also Patrick M. Garry, The Democratic Aspect of the Establishment Clause,
59 MERCER L. REV. 595, 611-17 (2008); Garry, supra note 12, at 15-24.
36. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790-91.
37. The Establishment Clause permits the accommodation of religion, for instance, in
solemnizing certain pubic events with invocations. As the Court has stated, government
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Legislative prayer was one such interplay that, as ruled by Marsh,
was meant to be accommodated by the Establishment Clause.38 Indeed,
public prayer was very common and accepted during the constitutional
period. For instance, this country’s first four presidents (the ones most
connected to the constitutional period) – Washington, Adams, Jefferson
and Madison – all declared numerous days of national prayer and
oversaw religious services held in federal government buildings. 39 The
day the First Amendment was adopted, Congress responded with a
When the Northwest Ordinance was
prayer of thanksgiving. 40
reenacted, the First Congress declared that religion was necessary for
good government. 41
D.

Full Circle Back to Marsh

The discussion of history brings the argument back, full circle, to
the precedent and rationale of Marsh. 42 The Court then, as it should
now, used history as an important guide in determining the meaning and
purpose of the Establishment Clause. History provides a more objective
and consistent meaning than that provided by the more subjective
endorsement test. 43
Problems with the endorsement test are evident in the Second
Circuit’s decision in Galloway. 44 The Second Circuit recognized that
prayer could not be banned, that prayer of some sort was allowed, and
that the judiciary should not become enmeshed in determining the proper
content of prayer. 45 Furthermore, the Second Circuit recognized that
Marsh prohibited government parsing of prayer – e.g., to determine if a
prayer is too religious. 46 Nonetheless, the Second Circuit violated all
“accommodation, acknowledgement, and support for religion are an accepted part of our political
and cultural heritage.” Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part). See also Garry, supra note 12, at 39-41.
38. For a discussion of the Establishment Clause and accommodation, see Garry, supra note
25, at 1171-73.
39. See Garry, supra note 10, at 670-74.
40. Id. at 672 & n. 46.
41. Id. at 672 & n. 44.
42. Marsh, 463 U.S. 783.
43. The endorsement test—relying on the Court’s conclusion as to what a reasonable
observer might perceive about a government interaction with religion and placing the determination
of ‘establishment’ in the perception of the individual perceiver—is “formless, unanchored,
subjective.” Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. District, 687 F.3d 840, 872 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
44. Galloway, 681 F.3d 20.
45. Id. at 33-34.
46. Id. at 31.
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these principles by delving into the content of the delivered prayers so as
to determine whether they might have made certain objectors feel like
outsiders. 47 But this approach, relying on each court’s individual
assessment of the psychological effects of individual prayers can
ultimately produce only one workable result – the banning of all prayer
in such venues. 48 On the other hand, if a court’s approach results in the
banning of all prayer, this in turn could cause violations of the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses, promote government hostility toward
religion, and effectively cement the Establishment Clause as a heckler’s
veto. 49
IV. CONCLUSION
In an increasingly secular society, secularism is important. But
secularism is the result of political and social forces. It is not the
mandate of the First Amendment. The Establishment Clause obviously
gives room for secularism to flourish, if society so wishes. But the
purpose of the Clause is not to further secularism.
The Establishment Clause was not meant to protect society from
religion, but to protect religious institutions from government
interference or discrimination. History provides the most objective and
accurate guide to applying the Establishment Clause. When courts can
follow history, they ought to do so. Granted, history may not provide a
clear answer in some circumstances; but when it does provide such an
answer, as with the practice of legislative prayer, it should be followed.
Marsh follows history, and the Supreme Court should follow Marsh in
its decision in Greece. If it fails to follow history, long-entrenched
practices such as presidential inauguration prayers, invocations before
congressional sessions, the national motto, and the opening of Supreme
Court sessions (“God save this Honorable Court”) will be thrown into
47. Marsh stated that the “content of the prayer is of no concern to judges” unless evidence
shows that “the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to
disparage any other, faith or belief.” 463 U.S. at 794-95. A judicial parsing of prayer language “not
only embroils judges in precisely those intrareligious controversies that the Constitution requires
[the judiciary] to avoid, but also imposes on [it] a task that [it is] incompetent to perform.” Rubin v.
City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087, 1100 (9th Cir. 2013). The endorsement test’s approach of
determining when prayers are too religious or when they are sufficiently absent of religious content
places the Court into the role of “a national theology board.” Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 678 (Kennedy,
J.).
48. The endorsement test is “no test at all, but merely a label for the judge’s largely
subjective impressions.” Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795,
815 (1993).
49. The law must avoid “an unjustified hostility toward religion, a hostility inconsistent with
our history and our precedents.” Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment
in part and dissenting in part).

ARTICLE 01 GARRY MACRO (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

doubt and conflict.

THE PRAYER IN GREECE

7/8/2014 2:46 PM

9

